Car Subscription Features Raise Your Risk of Government Surveillance, Police Records Show
Credit to Author: Dell Cameron| Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 10:30:00 +0000
Automakers are increasingly pushing consumers to accept monthly and annual fees to unlock pre-installed safety and performance features, from hands-free driving systems and heated seats to cameras that can automatically record accident situations. But the additional levels of internet connectivity this subscription model requires can increase drivers’ exposure to government surveillance and the likelihood of being caught up in police investigations.
A cache of more than two dozen police records recently reviewed by WIRED show US law enforcement agencies regularly trained on how to take advantage of “connected cars,” with subscription-based features drastically increasing the amount of data that can be accessed during investigations. The records make clear that law enforcement’s knowledge of the surveillance far exceeds that of the public, and reveal how corporate policies and technologies—not the law—determine driver privacy.
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“Each manufacturer has their whole protocol on how the operating system in the vehicle utilizes telematics, mobile wi-fi, et cetera,” one law enforcement officer noted in a presentation prepared by the California State Highway Patrol (CHP) and reviewed by WIRED. The presentation, while undated, contains statistics on connected cars for the year 2024. “If the vehicle has an active subscription,” they add, “it does create more data.”
The CHP presentation trains police on how to acquire data based on a variety of hypothetical scenarios, each describing how vehicle data can be acquired based on the year, make, and model of a vehicle. The presentation acknowledges that access to data can ultimately be limited due to choices made by not only vehicle manufacturers, but the internet service providers on which connected devices rely.
One document notes, for instance, that when a General Motors vehicle is equipped with an active OnStar subscription, it will transmit data—revealing its location—roughly twice as often as a Ford vehicle. Different ISPs appear to have not only different capabilities but policies when it comes to responding to government requests for information. Police may be able to rely on AT&T to help identify certain vehicles based on connected devices active in the car but lack the ability to do so when the device relies on a T-Mobile or Verizon network instead.
Charlotte McCoy, a GM spokesperson, tells WIRED the company now requires a court order before handing over location data to law enforcement. “We review each request individually to assess the circumstances and the nature of the request before providing any information,” they say. “Connectivity offers many benefits—including navigation, communication, safety, and maintenance—and customers can mask their location or turn off connectivity at any time.”
Other car manufacturers listed in the CHP presentation, including Ford, did not respond to a request for comment.
“There's definitely a role being played by the companies in deciding what kind of standard they're going to insist on,” says Andrew Crocker, the surveillance litigation director at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. “And this is a dynamic we've seen in other areas of tech. Google and Facebook and Apple all played a role in saying, ‘We'll only provide this data in response to a warrant, other data we'll provide in response to a subpoena.’”
When police are investigating a specific suspect, they will often use a technique known as a “ping” to geographically locate a specific device known to belong to that individual. But when canvassing near a crime scene for an unknown perpetrator, authorities commonly rely on a procedure known as a “tower dump,” requesting that ISPs cast a wider net and identify virtually any devices that have connected to a specific cell tower during a certain window of time. Police analysts can then comb through this data and attempt to identify a culprit, often using surveillance footage or witness testimony about a vehicle’s color, make, or model.
Nearly all subscription-based car features rely on devices that come pre-installed in a vehicle, with a cellular connection only necessary to enable the automaker's recurring-revenue scheme. The ability of car companies to charge users to activate some features is effectively the only reason the car’s systems need to communicate with cell towers. The police documents note that companies often hook customers into adopting the services through free trial offers, and in some cases, the devices are communicating with cell towers even when users decline to subscribe.
In an August 2022 email, one detective noted: “In some vehicles, again [it] depends on manufacturer, the vehicle is still doing this despite the lack of an active subscription, and just sending the data back to the mother ship. This could be due to collecting user data for what the manufacturer sells it for, to providing this data to try to sell you on renewing your [subscription] package that lapsed.”
The “tower dump” technique is becoming increasingly unpopular in US courts following the US Supreme Court’s acknowledgement in 2018 that location data raises significant Fourth Amendment concerns. While the Supreme Court specifically avoided addressing tower dumps in its landmark US v. Carpenter decision, a Fifth Circuit ruling last year placed the capability in great jeopardy, concluding that a warrant to “geofence” an area and collect evidence from a wide variety of individuals is inherently unconstitutional.
On the back of that decision, a federal magistrate in Mississippi ruled two months ago that tower dumps are likewise unconstitutional. While a “tower dump” and a “geofence” are not precisely the same—the latter relying on GPS coordinates obtained from internet companies such as Google, as opposed to a cell tower—the results are more or less identical: offering police a dragnet with which to accumulate vast amounts of location data on individuals, many if not most of whom are not suspected of committing a crime.
In response to the rapid changes in case law surrounding location data, Google—historically a frequent target of geofence warrants—announced technical changes to its software last year, making it effectively impossible to respond to these types of warrants.
“Location data is some of the most sensitive, revealing information that is generated by our devices, including our cars,” the EFF’s Crocker says. “It's extremely revealing of obviously where you go and where you've been, but also all the people you associate with and all the things you're doing. You can paint a very clear picture of someone's life with just a list of all the places they've been in their car. The Supreme Court has made that very clear.”
The police documents reviewed by WIRED alone demonstrate the arbitrary nature of vehicle surveillance upon this shifting legal landscape, with police noting, for instance, that while Verizon will refuse to allow police to define their own radius when requesting cell tower data, its competitors impose no such limitations. Another document notes that while AT&T will conduct “pings,” locating a device in real time, it will only do so for “voice devices.”
What is also clear from the documents is that US police are aware of the control corporations have over their ability to acquire vehicle location data, expressing fears that they could abruptly decide to kill off certain capabilities at any time.
In a letter sent in April 2024 to the Federal Trade Commission, Senators Ron Wyden and Edward Markey—Democrats of Oregon and Massachusetts, respectively—noted that a range of automakers, from Toyota, Nissan, and Subaru, among others, are willing to disclose location data to the government in response to a subpoena without a court order. Volkswagen, meanwhile, had its own arbitrary rules, limiting subpoenas to fewer than seven days’ worth of data. The senators noted that these policies stood in contrast to public pledges previously made by some automakers to require a warrant or court order before surrendering a customer’s location data.
Automakers “differ significantly on the important issue of whether customers are ever told they were spied on,” the senators wrote. At the time of the letter, only Tesla had a policy, they said, of informing customers about legal demands. “The other car companies do not tell their customers about government demands for their data, even if they are allowed to do so.”
“We respect our customers’ privacy and take our responsibility to protect their personal information seriously,” Bennet Ladyman, a T-Mobile spokesperson, says.
AT&T spokesperson Jim Kimberly says: “Like all companies, we are required by law to provide information to law enforcement and other government entities by complying with court orders, subpoenas, and other lawful discovery requests. In all cases, we review requests to determine whether they are valid. We require a search warrant based on the probable-cause standard for all government demands for real-time or historical location information, except in emergency situations. For government demands for cell tower searches, we require a probable-cause search warrant or a court order, except in emergency situations.”
Verizon did not respond to a request for comment.
“Especially now, with American civil liberties eroding rapidly, people should exercise great caution in granting new surveillance powers to law enforcement,” says Ryan Shapiro, executive director of Property of the People, a government transparency nonprofit that obtained the CHP presentation documents.
Jay Stanley, a senior policy analyst at the American Civil Liberties Union, notes that the police documents reviewed by WIRED contained substantial detail about car surveillance that appear to be publicly unavailable, suggesting that corporations are being far more open with law enforcement than they are with their own customers.
“It's an ongoing scandal that this kind of surveillance is taking place without people being aware of it, let alone giving permission for it,” Stanley says. “If they're carrying out surveillance on the public, the public should know. They should have meaningful knowledge and give meaningful consent before any kind of surveillance is activated, which clearly is not the case.”